India’s electronics debate is trapped between two unbearable camps. Government enthusiasts see every phone assembled in Tamil Nadu or Uttar Pradesh as proof that self-reliance has arrived. Cynics call the entire effort screwdriver assembly and imply nothing short of an indigenous processor, operating system and global brand counts as manufacturing. Both positions spare us the inconvenience of measuring progress honestly.
The progress is substantial. A MeitY report covering March 2026 records cumulative production, investment and employment under the large-scale electronics and IT-hardware incentive schemes, alongside approved semiconductor and packaging projects. The numbers demonstrate industrial activity at a scale that cannot reasonably be dismissed as a photo opportunity.
But scale is the beginning of an electronics strategy, not its graduation certificate. India still imports many high-value components, depends on foreign intellectual property and watches Chinese-origin brands command enormous consumer recognition. The government deserves credit for changing the production map. It should now be judged on whether India captures more value inside each device.
Assembly is not an insult
Every manufacturing ecosystem begins somewhere. Final assembly creates demand for logistics, tooling, quality control, packaging, testing and supplier coordination. It trains workers and forces state governments to solve power, land and customs problems. Countries do not teleport from imports to advanced component leadership.
The production-linked incentive scheme was designed to offset disadvantages in infrastructure, finance, supply chains and scale. MeitY’s official PLI description acknowledges these structural gaps and provides incentives on incremental sales for eligible manufacturing. That is industrial policy, not magic. It can alter corporate location decisions; it cannot guarantee technological sovereignty.
Critics who sneer at assembly often ignore how global electronics production actually works. No major smartphone is the creation of one self-contained nation. Components, software, capital equipment and design cross borders. The relevant question is not whether every part is Indian. It is whether Indian firms and workers move into activities with greater complexity, bargaining power and margins.
Government supporters make the opposite mistake by counting gross production as domestic value addition. A device assembled here with imported displays, memory, sensors and manufacturing equipment contributes real value, but less than its final price suggests. Policymakers should publish clear, comparable estimates of local value by product category and year. Without that, the debate oscillates between triumph and contempt.
Exports are encouraging because they test Indian plants against global cost and quality requirements. Yet an export assembled by a multinational remains different from an Indian-controlled product with domestic design and intellectual property. We should welcome the first while building conditions for the second.
Components are where ambition becomes expensive
The Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme reflects the next step. Its official portal sets out target segments including sub-assemblies, bare components, supply-chain equipment and telecom products. This is the right direction because component ecosystems are sticky. Once suppliers, tooling, engineers and customers cluster, the country becomes harder to bypass.
It is also where policy gets more difficult. Component plants need predictable demand, high utilisation, reliable utilities and fast customs. Some require large capital commitments and operate on thin margins. A subsidy may attract an announcement; only competitiveness keeps the line running after incentives expire.
India should avoid trying to localise everything simultaneously. Strategic selection matters. Printed circuit boards, camera modules, enclosures, batteries, power electronics, chargers and selected semiconductor packaging may offer different combinations of market demand and capability. The government must choose areas where domestic scale can plausibly produce global competitiveness rather than distribute incentives as industrial confetti.
Capital equipment is vital. A country dependent on imported machines for every production expansion remains vulnerable even if factories stand on Indian soil. Building equipment capability takes patient procurement, research links and demanding customers. Public policy should reward firms that develop process knowledge, not only those that meet a shipment threshold.
Skills policy must become specific. “Electronics jobs” cover line operators, maintenance technicians, process engineers, chip designers and supply-chain managers. Training institutions should publish placement and wage outcomes by role. A certificate that does not map to an actual production process is workforce theatre.
Why Chinese brands still understand Indian buyers
Chinese brands did not dominate India merely by underpricing everyone. They built distribution, service, financing, fast product cycles and features consumers could immediately appreciate. They treated charging speed, large batteries, cameras and retail visibility as an integrated market strategy. Indian brands often outsourced products, changed suppliers, abandoned software support and expected patriotism to cover inconsistency.
Make in India does not automatically create an Indian brand. A Chinese-controlled company can manufacture locally, employ Indian workers and source more domestic parts while retaining design, software and brand power elsewhere. That outcome benefits India, but it is not the same as domestic corporate leadership.
I do not support discriminatory rules designed to hand weak local firms a protected market. Consumers should not pay more for inferior devices to satisfy a flag graphic. Instead, India should create neutral advantages for durable behaviour: long software support, repairability, local R&D, component sourcing, data transparency and after-sales investment.
Indian firms need patient capital and product discipline. The temptation is to chase a launch window with a rebranded device, buy celebrity advertising and disappear when margins tighten. Brand trust is accumulated through boring acts: updates arrive, batteries remain available, warranties are honoured and a replacement part can be found after three years.
Government procurement could help domestic product companies, but only through performance standards and transparent tenders. Guaranteed purchases without quality pressure create captive mediocrity. Public buyers can provide scale while insisting on security audits, support life and repair access.
The scoreboard for the next five years
I would track six outcomes. First, domestic value addition by category. Second, component exports, not only final-device exports. Third, Indian-owned intellectual property and design revenue. Fourth, wages and skill progression in manufacturing jobs. Fifth, the survival of investment after incentive periods. Sixth, consumer outcomes such as repair access and software longevity.
Semiconductor projects deserve realism. Packaging and compound semiconductors can build capability while a leading-edge logic fab remains extraordinarily difficult and expensive. The political urge to announce “India’s first” must not override technical due diligence, water and power planning or market viability. A delayed credible plant is better than a ceremonial foundation stone.
States also need coordination. Competitive federalism can improve offers, but subsidy bidding wars may transfer public money without creating national capability. The Centre should publish project incentives, obligations and delivery milestones. If a firm receives land, tax support and infrastructure, citizens should know what investment and employment were promised and achieved.
Trade policy must remain predictable. Sudden tariff changes can encourage local assembly but punish component users or disrupt export competitiveness. Tariffs are a tool for sequencing capability, not a permanent substitute for it. Firms should know the glide path early enough to plan sourcing and capacity.
Research institutions and industry need incentives to share difficult problems. India produces excellent engineers, yet university-industry collaboration often ends at a memorandum photograph. Competitive grants should require working prototypes, process improvements or patent licensing, with outcomes published. Failure is acceptable in research; vagueness is not.
I give the Modi government genuine credit. Electronics manufacturing is more substantial than it was a decade ago, and the combination of market scale, infrastructure and targeted incentives has changed global boardroom calculations. Opposition politicians who dismiss the achievement because it complicates their decline narrative are being unserious.
But the government should distrust its own victory laps. Production totals can grow while high-value dependence remains. Jobs can expand without wages progressing. Multinationals can export from India while domestic brands fail to earn trust. The next phase will be slower and less photogenic because ecosystems are built supplier by supplier.
Chinese brands will continue to dominate significant parts of the Indian market until competitors match their combination of product, price, service and speed. Nationality alone is not a feature. The best response is not resentment but capability.
“Make in India” has finally acquired enough factory-floor evidence to be treated as policy rather than slogan. That is an achievement. Now we must retire the childish argument over whether assembly counts and ask how assembly becomes components, components become design, and design becomes a company Indian consumers voluntarily choose. The screwdriver was never shameful. Refusing to move beyond it would be.
