I have never understood why India’s political class treats the election calendar as if it were a sacred constitutional inheritance. It is not. Elections to the Lok Sabha and state assemblies were held together during the republic’s early years; the cycle broke after legislatures began falling early. What followed was not a carefully designed democratic ideal but an accident hardened into custom. The Narendra Modi government’s proposal for simultaneous elections therefore deserves more than the INDIA alliance’s familiar cry that democracy is about to be switched off. I support the basic objective because permanent campaigning has real costs: ministers become candidates, administrators become election staff, and policy is interpreted through whichever state votes next. Yet support should not require pretending that every clause is perfect. The bills need stronger safeguards for shortened legislative terms and deferred state elections. That is the useful argument Parliament should have, if the opposition can pause its constitutional theatre long enough to participate.
The status quo is not neutral
Critics often present staggered elections as the natural democratic order and simultaneous polls as an exotic BJP contraption. The historical record says otherwise. As the PRS Legislative Research brief explains, Lok Sabha and assembly elections ran together from 1951 until the cycle was disrupted by premature dissolutions in the late 1960s and 1970. That history does not prove that India must restore the old calendar, but it demolishes the claim that synchronisation is inherently alien to parliamentary government. I am especially unconvinced by Congress nostalgia on this subject. The party that dominated the era in which the original cycle collapsed now speaks as though today’s fragmented calendar arrived engraved on a constitutional tablet. It did not. Political choices created it, and political choices can redesign it.
The present arrangement produces a country that is almost always weeks away from a major campaign. That encourages every party, including the BJP, to optimise policy announcements for electoral timing. The Model Code of Conduct does not freeze all government, as some reform advocates melodramatically suggest, but repeated deployments of officials, security personnel and political attention still impose friction. More damaging is the mental model permanent elections create. A fuel-tax decision becomes a test for an approaching state poll. A welfare reform is postponed because one ally fears a regional backlash. Ministers who ought to defend a five-year programme are judged through a rolling series of local verdicts. Federalism should mean meaningful state power, not a national government spending much of its term nervously reading district-level campaign reports.
I also reject the argument that voters cannot distinguish between national and state choices when elections coincide. Indians split their tickets, punish incumbents selectively and understand layers of government rather better than Delhi commentators sometimes assume. Simultaneous voting may create a common political atmosphere, but so do national television, social media and prime-ministerial campaigning under the current system. The solution to a dominant national party is for its opponents to become more persuasive, not to defend administrative inconvenience as a campaign subsidy. Congress and its allies sound particularly weak when they imply that voters exposed to two ballots on one day will helplessly press the same symbol twice. That is not a defence of democracy; it is a rather insulting theory of the electorate.
The bill’s weak point is the shortened mandate
The government nevertheless has serious drafting work to do. Under the proposed framework, if a Lok Sabha or assembly falls before completing five years, the replacement would serve only the remainder of the common cycle. The mechanism preserves synchronisation, but it can produce absurdly short mandates. A government elected for eight or ten months would face incentives to campaign immediately rather than govern. PRS’s detailed legislative analysis rightly asks whether such brief legislatures can provide effective administration and scrutiny. This is not an opposition conspiracy; it is a design problem. Pro-government voices do the reform no favour when they wave it away.
I would prefer a constructive-vote-of-no-confidence mechanism, under which a government can be removed only when an alternative majority is ready to take office. Germany and several other parliamentary systems use versions of this idea. India need not copy them mechanically, but the principle fits the problem: legislators retain the power to replace a ministry, while opportunistic collapses become harder. Another option is a carefully bounded caretaker arrangement followed by a full election at the next common window. Either route requires constitutional precision and broad consultation. The government should welcome amendments that make the system more stable without insulating an unpopular ministry from legislative accountability.
The power to defer a particular state election also needs tighter guardrails. The proposal allows the Election Commission to recommend postponement and the President to order a later poll, but the conditions and outer time limit deserve explicit treatment. A reform sold as predictability cannot contain an open-ended ambiguity about when a state gets its assembly. Parliament should specify objective grounds, require a reasoned public order and impose a short maximum delay, subject to judicial review. These are not concessions to the INDIA alliance’s claim of impending authoritarianism. They are the constitutional bolts that would make the government’s machine safe enough to operate.
Federalism is stronger than a calendar
The most overheated objection is that simultaneous elections would destroy federalism by nationalising state campaigns. I do not buy it. Federalism resides in the Constitution’s distribution of powers, fiscal arrangements, the Rajya Sabha, state institutions, regional parties and the electorate’s attachment to local questions. None of those disappears because two polling booths operate on the same day. Tamil Nadu does not cease to have a distinctive political culture. Odisha does not forget its local leadership. West Bengal’s voters do not suddenly lose the ability to evaluate their state government. Regional parties that have built authentic organisations will continue to compete. Those dependent on being the only election in the television cycle may suffer, but media exclusivity is not a constitutional right.
There is, however, a practical risk that a vast common campaign could further privilege parties with money, cadres and national media reach. The BJP plainly possesses those advantages today. The honest response is to strengthen disclosure, enforce spending rules and ensure equitable access to public broadcasting—not preserve a permanently rolling election in the hope that a weaker opposition sometimes catches the governing party tired. I give the government credit for placing a structural reform on the table. I would give it more credit if it paired that reform with cleaner political-finance rules. Electoral efficiency without financial transparency would look self-serving even when the underlying proposal is sound.
Nor should cost savings be oversold. Government expenditure on conducting elections is meaningful, but democracy is supposed to cost money. The strongest case is administrative focus and a clearer governing rhythm, not the fantasy that election expenses will suddenly finance hospitals. Parties will still advertise; candidates will still travel; security will still be deployed. The public should be promised fewer disruptions, not a fiscal bonanza. Reform advocates weaken themselves when they attach every available virtue to one institutional change.
The opposition should negotiate instead of performing
Congress has a choice. It can engage with the actual clauses, secure safeguards for states and claim credit for improving a consequential amendment. Or it can again announce that the republic’s funeral is scheduled for the next parliamentary sitting. The second option is easier and has become habitual. We saw the same reflexive maximalism around several reforms: first describe the proposal as an assault on the Constitution, then avoid the tedious committee work through which constitutional systems are actually protected. The government, for its part, should not treat consultation as a ceremonial stop before passage. A change governing every election needs legitimacy beyond a bare numerical victory.
My position is therefore supportive but conditional. India should move toward a common electoral cycle because endless campaigning is not the highest form of democracy. The bills should return from committee with a constructive no-confidence safeguard, strict limits on deferred polls, clear rules for caretaker administrations and a credible transition schedule. Local-body elections should be handled with respect for state election commissions rather than pulled casually into a central timetable. If the Modi government gets those details right, it will have delivered an institutional reform larger than another scheme or slogan. If it rushes, it will hand its critics a valid objection they have so far buried beneath invalid panic.
I am tired of the assumption that protecting democracy means preserving every inherited inconvenience. Institutions survive by being redesigned carefully, not embalmed. Simultaneous elections will not end political conflict, weaken every regional party or guarantee better government. They can, however, give administrations a longer stretch in which governing is not merely the interval between rallies. That modest promise is worth pursuing. The opposition should stop inventing a coup, and the government should start perfecting its case.



