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Make in India Phones Are Real Progress, but the Component Bill Still Goes Abroad

India has moved beyond merely importing finished smartphones, and the government deserves credit for that shift. The next test is deeper component capability, local design and Indian brands strong enough to compete with Chinese distribution machines.

Priya Nair
· 7 min read
Make in India Phones Are Real Progress, but the Component Bill Still Goes Abroad
123net / CC BY-SA 3.0

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The debate over Indian electronics manufacturing is trapped between two slogans. Government supporters point to export growth and declare India a global factory. Critics call the entire enterprise screwdriver assembly and declare nothing has changed. Both positions are lazy. India has genuinely built large-scale phone assembly, attracted supply-chain investment and learned industrial disciplines that did not exist at comparable scale a decade ago. The production-linked incentive strategy deserves credit for accelerating that movement. But assembly is the first chapter, not the finished book. A phone can leave an Indian factory while much of its value—display, memory, processor, camera components and intellectual property—originates elsewhere. The next policy phase must reward depth rather than indefinitely celebrating volume. Otherwise India will manufacture millions of devices while remaining vulnerable to imported components and foreign brands.

Assembly was not a fake achievement

I have little patience for commentators who use “assembly” as an insult. Every complex manufacturing ecosystem begins by mastering stages, supplier coordination, quality control, logistics and scale. Workers, engineers and firms acquire capabilities through production, not seminar declarations. The government’s large-scale electronics PLI framework explicitly used incentives on incremental sales to attract mobile-phone and component manufacturing. That was an intervention, not spontaneous market weather.

The results include a visible expansion of phone production and exports. Supporters are right to say India is no longer simply a market into which finished handsets arrive. Apple’s supplier network, Samsung and contract manufacturers have built significant operations. These factories create employment, develop vendor relationships and give policymakers leverage to pursue further localisation. Dismissing all of that because the application processor is imported confuses an incomplete climb with standing still.

Yet incentives can become addictive. If firms expand only while the state pays for incremental output, policy has purchased activity rather than competitiveness. The purpose of PLI should be to overcome initial disadvantages—logistics, ecosystem gaps, scale and risk—then taper as clusters become self-sustaining. Government must publish clear, comparable data on approved investment, actual production, incentives disbursed, jobs and domestic value addition. “Made in India” should become a measurable industrial description, not a sticker capable of meaning anything.

The component gap is now the central problem

India’s own policy documents recognise the weakness. The notification establishing the Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme notes both the rapid growth in electronics exports and the corresponding rise in imports of components required for finished goods. The official ECMS notification is unusually useful because it states the tension plainly. Output growth can increase import dependence when the domestic supply base remains shallow.

The newer scheme targets sub-assemblies, printed circuit boards, passive components, enclosures, camera and display modules, lithium-ion cells for digital applications and manufacturing equipment. That is the right direction. Components generate learning across products; a capable PCB or enclosure supplier can serve phones, laptops, telecom equipment and industrial electronics. The value lies not only in import substitution but in engineering feedback between designers and factories.

Still, policymakers should resist announcing a “local” display or camera module when the most valuable inputs remain imported and only final integration occurs here. Localisation exists on a spectrum. Public reporting should show value added at each stage and identify dependencies by country and supplier concentration. Strategic resilience is not achieved by replacing import of a finished phone with import of a nearly complete kit.

Chinese brands dominate for reasons beyond price

Some political commentary assumes that Chinese smartphone brands succeed in India only because they dump cheap hardware or spend lavishly on advertising. Those factors may matter in particular cases, but the larger explanation is competence. Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, Realme and others built distribution, retail incentives, frequent model cycles, localised software features and specifications aligned with Indian aspiration. They learned that a customer buying a ₹15,000 phone still wants the design language of a premium object.

Indian brands once had meaningful share but often depended heavily on imported reference designs, inconsistent software support and thin research capability. When Chinese rivals combined aggressive pricing with better cameras, batteries, screens and channel execution, domestic labels struggled. Patriotism cannot compensate for a phone that receives late security updates or fails after-sales expectations. Consumers spending household money are not obliged to conduct industrial policy through inferior purchases.

Chinese brands also manufacture through Indian facilities and local partners, which complicates nationalist shorthand. The relevant questions are where value is created, who controls design and software, how data is governed, whether competition is fair and how profits and intellectual property flow. A brand’s nationality alone does not describe its industrial contribution. India should enforce security, tax and competition rules consistently without pretending that a logo determines the complete supply chain.

Design capability is the missing ambition

Manufacturing policy loves visible factories because ribbon-cuttings photograph well. Design work is less visible and often more valuable. India needs firms capable of product architecture, radio-frequency engineering, camera tuning, power management, industrial design and long-term software maintenance. It needs semiconductor design to connect with products manufactured domestically. Otherwise local factories remain implementers of decisions made elsewhere.

Government incentives should therefore reward research teams, patents that correspond to real products, locally developed tooling and products designed for export—not simply units shipped. Universities and technical institutes need stronger applied partnerships with manufacturers. Smaller firms should access testing facilities without buying every expensive instrument. Public procurement can create early demand for well-designed Indian electronics, but standards must remain high. Protected mediocrity will poison the brand of domestic technology.

There is a useful role for foreign companies here. India does not need to choose between indigenous capability and global value chains. Supplier engineers learn from international production; multinational research centres employ Indian talent; joint ventures can transfer process knowledge. The state’s job is to make local capability accumulate rather than remain a low-cost service rented by foreign intellectual property.

Jobs must become careers

Electronics factories can create large numbers of jobs, including for women entering formal manufacturing. That is socially significant. But job counts alone hide wage progression, contract status, safety, transport, housing and the route from line work to technician or supervisor roles. A successful cluster should produce careers and local supplier entrepreneurship, not an endlessly replaceable workforce.

Training policy must be built with factories rather than around generic certificates. Workers need instruction tied to actual equipment and quality systems. Technicians should gain portable credentials. Employers receiving public incentives should report retention, training hours and advancement by gender. This is not burdensome moral decoration; stable, skilled workers improve yield and productivity.

Clusters also require urban planning. A factory zone without safe buses, affordable housing, clinics and childcare pushes hidden costs onto workers, especially women. Industrial policy cannot stop at the gate. State governments competing for plants should be judged on the living ecosystem they build, not only land concessions and electricity tariffs.

A tougher, fairer scorecard

I would evaluate the next five years using six questions. Has domestic value addition increased? Are component imports less concentrated? Do Indian engineers control more product design? Have exports diversified beyond one or two companies? Are factory jobs becoming skilled careers? Can an Indian consumer buy a domestically designed phone with reliable updates and service without making a patriotic sacrifice?

The government can answer positively only if it remains willing to revise schemes. Incentives should decline for mature assembly and rise for difficult components, tooling and design. Fraud and relabelling must be punished. Customs policy should be predictable enough for investment, not changed so often that firms optimise lobbying rather than production. Approval announcements should be separated from operational results.

I give Make in India electronics more credit than its fashionable critics do. Moving from import dependence to large-scale assembly was substantial. I also expect more than its cheerleaders demand. The ultimate success is not a record shipment accompanied by a celebratory hashtag. It is an ecosystem that can design, source, build, repair and improve products in India while competing abroad.

Chinese brands will continue to dominate segments as long as they understand Indian buyers better and execute faster. The proper response is not resentment. It is capability. India has built the factory floor. Now it must build the supplier depth, design authority and consumer trust that make the floor difficult to relocate. That is when “Made in India” will describe economic power rather than the last stop on an imported bill of materials.

#make in india #electronics #pli scheme #smartphones
Priya Nair

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Tracks what 'Make in India' electronics policy actually delivers versus what it promises, and why Chinese brands still eat everyone's lunch here.

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