Every Indian election now arrives with a pre-written obituary for Indian democracy. The names and constituencies change; the prose barely does. A television studio discovers authoritarianism at breakfast, an alliance spokesperson announces institutional collapse by lunch, and an overseas essay explains the Indian voter to Indians before dinner. Then citizens turn up in their hundreds of millions and make the script awkward. I do not think turnout alone proves institutional perfection. I do think the actual figures make the INDIA alliance’s permanent emergency theatre look increasingly detached from the country it claims to defend.
The Election Commission’s 2024 atlas records a turnout of 66.10 per cent, excluding uncontested Surat, and places it alongside the historical series on its turnout page. Another ECI table says 64.64 crore votes were cast, up from 61.47 crore in 2019, even though the percentage dipped slightly as the electorate expanded. Those are not the numbers of a public that regards voting as decorative. They show a vast, competitive democratic habit surviving heat, distance, misinformation and the very human irritation of queues.
Participation is evidence, not absolution
Let me be precise because the usual rebuttal is predictable. High participation does not prove that every institutional decision was correct. Voters can participate enthusiastically while questioning campaign finance, media concentration, enforcement consistency or the quality of candidates. The Election Commission should answer criticism promptly and publish granular data in forms citizens can audit. I have no interest in replacing opposition melodrama with government complacency.
But evidence must constrain rhetoric. When an opposition leader leaps from a disputed administrative decision to the declaration that democracy has effectively ended, the burden is on that leader to explain why voters continue to organise, campaign, defeat incumbents and produce split verdicts. The 2024 Lok Sabha result itself denied the BJP a solo majority. If India were the stage-managed autocracy routinely described in fashionable columns, that outcome requires a remarkably self-sabotaging scriptwriter.
The ECI’s data on women’s participation is especially important. Women constituted nearly half the registered electorate, and female turnout has become a decisive force rather than a sociological appendix. This has changed campaign behaviour. Parties must now speak to beneficiaries and voters who evaluate cooking fuel, toilets, water, transport, safety and cash transfers through everyday experience. That shift helps explain the BJP’s investment in direct delivery. It also explains why old patronage networks feel less secure.
Manufactured outrage has a short shelf life
The opposition’s problem is not that it raises institutional questions. It is that it raises every question at the volume reserved for constitutional catastrophe. Voting machines, scheduling, campaign speeches, agency action and social-media clips are poured into one cauldron and labelled the death of democracy. When every grievance is existential, genuine institutional problems struggle to command distinct attention. The public learns to discount the alarm.
The commentariat encourages this because outrage is more marketable than administration. A district-level revision of rolls is tedious. A claim of mass disenfranchisement travels. A procedural note is boring. A dark warning about the republic attracts invitations. I have watched perfectly legitimate questions become weaker because their advocates rushed past verification in pursuit of moral grandeur. Democracy is not defended by making claims that collapse under the first table of public data.
Congress, in particular, has never reconciled itself to the loss of narrative authority. For decades, a relatively small Delhi ecosystem decided which institutions were respectable, which protests represented the nation and which electoral mandates required qualification. The BJP’s rise shattered that arrangement. The reaction has often been to treat voters outside that ecosystem as manipulated, communal or insufficiently sophisticated. That is not democratic anxiety. It is wounded entitlement wearing constitutional vocabulary.
The BJP should not become smug
A right-of-centre column should say what partisan cheerleaders avoid: the BJP benefits from strong organisation, abundant resources and a leader with unmatched reach, and those advantages make restraint more important. Enforcement agencies must not appear selectively energetic. Parliamentary debate should not be treated as a nuisance. Election authorities should communicate decisions in plain language and release machine-readable data quickly. Institutional trust grows when power voluntarily accepts rules it could politically survive bending.
I also think the government’s supporters are too quick to answer every criticism with the Emergency. Congress’s record matters, especially when its veterans preach institutional purity without irony. But 1975 cannot be a perpetual permission slip. The relevant standard for the current government is not whether it is better than Indira Gandhi at her worst. It is whether a confident twenty-first-century India can make its institutions more transparent, predictable and fair.
Nor should turnout be fetishised. Some constituencies report much lower participation than others; migrant workers face practical barriers; urban apathy persists; and the registration process can still be bewildering. The proper response is specific reform—portable facilitation where constitutionally and technically sound, cleaner rolls, accessible polling stations, better information—not a sweeping declaration that the entire exercise is fraudulent.
Respect the voter enough to read the result
The most revealing feature of Indian elections is their refusal to satisfy anyone completely. Voters can reward Narendra Modi nationally, dismiss a BJP state government, preserve a regional party and punish a local candidate within a short period. They distinguish between levels of government more shrewdly than many analysts distinguish between television panels. This volatility is evidence of agency.
The INDIA alliance would be more formidable if it stopped treating every loss as proof of institutional capture and every win as the restoration of popular wisdom. A process cannot become legitimate only when Rahul Gandhi likes the result. Opposition parties should scrutinise rolls booth by booth, train agents, build local organisations and present credible policy. That work is less glamorous than a press conference about democratic darkness, but it is how democratic power is actually won.
I remain in favour of relentless institutional scrutiny. I am against evidence-free fatalism marketed as courage. The participation figures do not tell us that Indian democracy needs no repair. They tell us that Indians still claim it vigorously. Any party seeking their vote should begin with respect for that fact. The obituary writers may keep filing copy; the voter, inconveniently, keeps showing up.



